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VENEZUELA: POTENTIAL DEMAND FOR CASSAVA 
Macroeconomic Policy and Agriculture 
To better understand t he agricultural development of Venezuela , we will 
briefly review how the country's economy has evolved and the set of global 
policies that have shaped it, so that later we can concentra te on the set 
of specific policies that affect the agricultural sector. 
Economic policy context 
By 1985 Venezuela hada population of 17.4 million people, (81.3% 
urban) a per capita GDP of US$2,451 (in 1984 dollars), international 
reserves of US$12.5 billion, a total disbursed external debt of US$30 
billion, exports of goods and services of US$14.3 billion, and imports for 
US$6 . 7 billion for a positive balance of US$7 . 6 billion in current accounts 
(Table 1). 
Greatly increased oil revenues in the 1970s catapulted the country 
from the status of a developing country into the ranks of a middle-income 
nation. Oil constitutes the basis of the economy accounting for about 75% 
of government revenues and over 90% of export earnings. 
Recent growth of the Venezuelan economy can be divided in three 
periods: 1958 to 1973, 1973 to 1978, and 1978 to present. The first period 
started with the installation of the democratic regime of Romulo 
Betancourt. The new policy of import substitution was formulated, 
following Prebish's theories on the subject. Real GDP grew annually at 
5 . 5% during the 1958-73 period while agriculture had a similarly strong 
growth of 4.3% . The livestock sector was especially dynamic growing at 
6.6% per year while crops grew 2.7% annually (Table 2). 
In 1973 , oil prices boomed and the economy's pace was accelerated with 
real GDP growing at 6.3% per year from 1973 to 1978. The livestock sector 
continued its remarkable expansion at 7.3% while crops grew at 5 . 0% 
(Table 2). 
After 1978 the country entered a recession that was characterized by a 
sharp fall in oil export income, combined with an inability to continue 
borrowing abroad , an expanded foreign debt burden, an overvalued currency, 
and massive capital flight. A financial and foreign exchange crisis 
occurred in early 1983. Foreign r eserves went from US$19 billion in 1981 
to less than US$7 billion in 1983. Exchange controls, devaluation, and 
austerity measures brought the country 's external accounts into balance . 
In 1978-85 , real GDP decreased atan annual rate of -1. 5% while 
agriculture as a whole grew annually at 1. 7%. The crop value of production 
had no significant trend (0 . 3% annually) while livestock continued to 
outpace most of the activities at 3 .1% per year (Table 2) . 
The policy environment 
Agriculture in Venezuela has been affected by wha t is known as the 
"Dutch Disease." The large influx of foreign exchange r esulting from a 
Table l. Statistical profile of Venezuela 
2 Area (km ) 
Population: total 1985 (81.3% urban) 
Annual growth rate 1970- 85 
Birth rate (1984) 
Mortality per 1000 inhabitants (1984) 
2 
lnfant mortality per 1000 live births (1984) 
Life expec t ancy at birth (1984) 
Percentage of literacy (1984) 
Labor force by sector (1985) 
Agriculture 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Construc tion 
Others 
Beef production 
Total GDP (marke t prices) 
Agricultural sector 
Mining sector 
Manufacturing sector 
Construction sector 
Central government 
Current revenues 
Current expenditures 
Current savings b 
Capital expenditur es 
Capital or surplus 
Domestic financing 
Money, prices and salaries 
Domestic credi t 
Public sec tor 
Private sector 
Money s upply (MI) 
Consurner prices (annual average) 
Real wages 
Exchange rate 
Official rate (nat ional currency 
units per dollar ) 
Real effective exhange r ate 
Ｈｩｮ｣ｾｸ＠ 1980•100) 
Terms of trade 
(Index 1980•100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account balance 
Merchandise balance 
Merchandise exports (FOB) 
Merchandise imports (FOB) 
Net services 
Transfers 
Capital account (net) 
Change in net reserves (- .. increase) 
External public debt 
Disbursed debt 
Debt service actually paid 
Interest payments/export of 
goods and NFS 
a. Preliminary estimate 
1981 
-03 
- 1.9 
- 2.5 
-2.5 
- 2.1 
32.5 
19.9 
12.6 
14.6 
-2.0 
2.4 
10.5 
36.7 
9 . 1 
9.5 
16.0 
-5. 4 
4.30 
91.2 
99 . 0 
3.9999 . 7 
7.840.2 
19 . 963.2 
- 12 .1 22 . 9 
-3.431 . 4 
-409 . 2 
-1.881.9 
20 . 0 
11.382.0 
2.588.3 
5.9 
1982 
0.7 
3.6 
-1 0.2 
4. 1 
-8.4 
26.9 
18.7 
8.1 
13.0 
-4.9 
2.2 
22.4 
86.9 
12.7 
5.6 
9.7 
-0.1 
4.30 
85.7 
98.3 
898.805 
17,335 ,000 
2.9 
29.9 
4 .6 
27 . 3 
58.6 
85 . 95 
{Percentages) 
14.5 
1.3 
15 . 7 
8.6 
59 . 9 
1983 
(Growth rates ) 
- 5 . 6 
1984 
- 1.4 
0.8 
1.9 
4 . 6 
0 .4 
- 6.3 
- 1.7 
-13 . 3 
(Per centages of 
24 .7 
18.6 
8 . 1 
8.4 
-2.3 
2 . 8 
-34.4 
GDP) 
28 . 5 
19.8 
8 . 7 
6.0 
2.7 
-1. 4 
(Growth rates) 
6 .2 13.3 
76.1 n.a . 
5.5 16.7 
20 . 7 23.8 
6 .3 12 . 2 
-7.2 -5.2 
(Annual average) 
4.30 7 . 02 
90.7 115.4 
95 . 2 101 . 5 
(Millions of 
- 3.999.2 4.426.7 
dollars) 
4,970 . 3 
7.973.6 
15.850 . 8 
- 7 . 877 . 2 
2.588.9 8.161.8 
15.386 . 2 14.570 . 5 
-1 2.797.4 - 6 . 408 . 7 
- 5.985.8 -3.524 . 5 -2.824 . 9 
-602.2 -210 . 6 -1 78.4 
-1. 656 . 9 -4.098.5 -3.506 . 6 
7.692.6 - 336 .7 - 1.567 . 2 
(Millions of dollars) 
12.122.5 12.9 11. 4 17.248.6 
3.220.8 2.655.8 2.536.4 
11.1 10.9 8 . 6 
b. Capital revenue is taken into account in calculating the deficit. 
- 0.4 
7. 0 
-4.8 
3.3 
-17.4 
28.6 
19.5 
9 . 1 
6.9 
2.3 
- 2 . 3 
- 7 .8 
n.a. 
8 . 1 
5.8 
12 . 0 
n.a. 
7 . 50 
112.6 
99 .0 
3,927 .0 
7 . 604 . 0 
14 . 197.0 
- 6.593.0 
-3 .535 . 0 
-1 42 . 0 
-2 . 577.0 
-1. 350 .0 
n.a. 
n.a . 
n.a. 
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Table 2 . Annual growth rates (%) of real gross domestic product 
in agriculture and its subsect ors . 
Period Total Agriculture Crops Livestock 
1958- 73 5.5 4.3 2 . 7 6 . 6 
1973-78 6.3 4 . 7 5 . 1 7 . 3 
1978-85 - 1.5 1.9 0 . 3 3. 1 
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spectacular rise in oil prices (from around US$5.00 per barrel in 1972 to 
near US$40 in 1979) brought about a spending effect which raised the demand 
for both tradeables and nontradeables and increased the prices of the 
latter with a consequent appreciat ion in the exchange rate (Valdes, p. 
170) . In addition, resources have been sucked into the booming sector, 
moving labor from agriculture to t he services and government sectors. 
Urbanization has occur red a t an accelerated pace since the 1930s (Table 3). 
At the same time a rising demand for food products emerged . 
Under those circumstances , government actions to redirect resource 
allocation become crucial to stimulate growth in the non- oil sectors of the 
economy and particularly in agriculture, which is directly affected by the 
rural- urban migration . 
The major policy tools devised by the government have to do with the 
administrat ion of oil-related activities. Extractive industries have been 
nationalized. A special fund (Venezuelan Investment Fund) was created 
primarily for investment abroad in order to avoid internal fluctuations 
related with changing conditions i n the oil market, and as a regulatory 
fund. 
To compensate for the disequilibriums brought about by the oil sector, 
the government has operated a vast set of complementary tools ranging from 
exchange ra t e policy, t o price controls, fiscal incentives, credit research 
and extension, and commercialization, all designed to stimulate industry 
and agriculture . 
Exchange rate policy has been characterized by fixed rates with the 
U.S . dollar throughout most of the past three decades . Two exceptional 
cases occurred . In 1960, shortly after the democratic regime of Betancourt 
carne to power, exchange rate controls were necessary to avoid capital 
outflows. By 1964 the controls were eliminated and the Bolívar had been 
devaluated from Bs3.35/US$1.00 to Bs4.50/US$1.00. 
In 1983 the financial and economic crisis that followed the sharp 
reductions in oil incomes and the rise in international interes t rates made 
government intervention in the exchange market imperative . A progressive 
devaluation of the bolívar (within a multiple-rate system) and sharp 
restrictions of imports through import and foreign exchange control were 
established . 
Agriculture in Venezue l a 
The agricultural sector in Venezuela contributes 7 .4% to the GDP , and 
occupies 18% of t he labor force. By subsectors, livestock contributes 
3.4%, crops 3 . 3%, fisheries 0.2% and the rest of the agricultural sect or 
has a 0.3% share of GDP. In addition, 45% of the manufacturing sector is 
composed of the food indus try ; this implies a n additional 9 . 4% contribution 
to the GDP by the food and fiber sector of the country. 
Urbanization took place at a rapid pace going from 26% of the total 
population in 1920 to 81.3% in 1985 . Traditionally, the country has been a 
food importer. In 1950 nearly 30% of the agricultural supply was imported 
while in 1985 this increased to SO%. 
Table 3. 
5 
Evolution of exports and population composition 
in Venezuela, 1920-1980. 
Percent of exports Percent of population 
Year Coffee-Cocoa Oil Rural Urban 
1920 92.0 2. 0 74 . 0 26.0 
1930 15.0 83 . 0 65.3 34 . 7 
1940 4.0 94.0 60 . 6 39.4 
1950 3.0 96 . 0 46.6 53.4 
1960 2.0 90 . 0 32 . 6 67 . 4 
1970 0.8 90 . 2 24 . 3 75 . 7 
1978 82 . 5 24 . 3 75 . 7 
1980 0.2 92.0 23.9 76 . 1 
SOURCE: Dirección General de Estadísticas . 
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In the 1920s, Venezuela was heavily dependent upon agriculture (36% of 
GDP) and 95% of exports and 75% of the population lived in the rural 
sector . In the 1930s, the country's economy shifted to the mining sector, 
with special emphasis given to oil- and steel-based activities (Table 3). 
In the 1950s, the country saw an important influx of immigrants . The 
military regime resettled about 400,000 Europeans and 40,000 Colombians in 
1950-58 through IAN (Wright, 1982). These immigrants were respons ible for 
a dynamic real growth of the sector during the period (annual rate of 6.0%) 
while total GDP grew at an annual rate of 8.4% also in real terms. 
One-half of the growth in agriculture was made up by the livestock sector 
(dairy, cattle, and poultry) (World Bank, 1961). By 1944, Protinal, the 
largest animal-feed firm had been founded. In a welcome environment, 
multinational firms established and expanded subsidiaries which had 
formerly had a market for their products as imports in Venezuela: milk, 
milling, feed, and processed food firms (Wright, 1982). 
In 1958, under the democratic rule of Betancourt, the new policy of 
import substitution, Prebish- style, was formulated. The basic idea was 
that the new, reliable processing sector could enlarge the market for 
agricultura! raw materials that could be produced internally . In turn, the 
agricultura! sector provided food for a rapidly growing urban population, 
making income available for the agricultura! sector to purchase the 
products of new industries and allowing savings to be transferred to the 
industrial sector. 
Cordiplan, (an agency at the level of presidential secretary), was 
created to implement planning on a national basis. The Agrarian Reform Law 
of 1960 was implemented. About 74% of all land redistributed was publicly 
owned (5.6 million hectares) as compared with 1.9 million ha of 
private-property redistribution between 1960 and 1970. Therefore there was 
no change in the land tenancy structure. Policies benefited mostly farmers 
with holdings of 500 to 2,499 ha (Wright, 1982), through directed 
subsidized credit, extension, and insurance programs. The land title 
situation was unclear in about one-third of the cases, disallowing those 
farmers to obtain access to main policies of credit and extension. 
The process of food industry integration and diversification was also 
accompanied by an increased market-power concentration in that sector. 
Throughout the past two decades, three firms have controlled 80% to 95% of 
the market for feed and another three firms 85% of the market for wheat 
flour . Inputs for these industries were based on crops grown in temperate 
climates. Little research was done concerning the substitution of other 
crops suitable for local conditions previous to 1968, and little use of 
available evidence has been made to incorporate cassava or rice into their 
technology (Wright, 1982). 
Agricultura! production responded well to the incentives. Its value 
grew in an accelerated fashion and was followed by a reduction in 
agricultura! imports. The percentage of agricultura! imports in total 
consumption in 1958 was 45%, in 1960 this decreased to 32.7%, and again in 
1970 to 25.2%. 
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Tremendous growth took place in products used as inputs to the food 
processing industry (rice, sesame, cotton, sugar cane and tobacco) also , in 
those destined to urban consumption (livestock products and vegetobles) . 
The seventies witnessed a reversal in food import trends. Real crop 
production declined in 1970- 73 by 1.1% per year but the decline was 
partially compensated for by a 4.2% growth in the livestock subsector. 
Although food production was reactivated after 1974 in response to the 
extraordinary increases in investments coming from t he booming oil prices , 
demand outpaced production and agricultural imports increased dramatically 
(Table 4). 
This process was curtailed by the sharp reduction in oil prices and 
rapid growth in the cost of funds in international money markets initiated 
in 1979 . The economic and financial crisis that followed led to a control 
on foreign exchange and the establishment of a multiple-exchange rate 
system. 
The multiple rate system enforced had a free market rate for dollar 
transactions with the Banco Central de Venezuela and two preferential 
rates. The preferential rate for agricultural imports (both products and 
inputs) and debt payments was at Bs4.30 per U.S. dollar. For other 
imports, which were severely regulated by prohibitions, prior licensing, 
and quotas, a preferential rate of Bs6 . 00 per U.S. dollar was set. 
To avoid inflation, and given the large import component in the diets, 
particularly by the least-favored sectors of the economy, a system of 
administered prices was imposed. Finally, external debt payments were 
restructured. 
Signs of improvement have already been recorded. Imports, that 
reached US$13 . 6 million by 1982 were US$6.6 million in 1985. Agricultural 
production grew fast spurred by area that increased from 1.5 million ha in 
1983 to 1.8 million ha in 1985. Inflation has remained low (6% for 1985), 
but unemployment is high at around 13% (up from 9.5% in 1982). 
Specific agricultural policies 
The main goals of agricultural policy still are to substitute imports 
and foster domestic food production, to expand the agricultural frontier, 
and improve productivit y and profitability in the sector . 
Specific instruments used, along with the exchange rate system 
described, are price controls and commercialization, credit policies, and 
research and extension . 
Price controls. Given the importance that imported foods have on the 
diets of the Venezuelans and the high concentration they have in the 
processing industry, the government has felt the need to implement 
controlled consumer prices for several food items over the past three 
decades. Dairy, wheat, maize, rice, and livestock meats and their 
processed products have been the target items. 
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Table 4. Agricultural imports and production in Venezuela, 
1970-78. 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Value of agricultural 
production 
(Millions of 1960 Bs) 
4' 137 
4,197 
4' 141 
4,355 
4,663 
5,005 
4,922 
5,306 
5,634 
SOURCE: BID, FCA Project . 1984. 
Imports of processed 
and nonprocessed 
agricultural goods 
(Millions of 1960 Bs) 
1,471 
1, 248 
1 '393 
2,021 
2,912 
3,981 
3,650 
6' 141 
6,450 
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Recent price controls have not s timula t ed consumption of locally 
produced foods (rice, beef, roots and t ubers, etc.) in favor of t he 
imported ones (mainly wheat and coarse grains) by shif ting consumpt i on to 
the latter group and contracting t he demand for those produced locally 
(Tables S and 6). 
A look a t price evolution shows an increase fo r agricultura! 
commodities wi th respect to other items in the r es t of the economy . This 
shows the great effort given t o promete food production by creating a 
profitable env ironment. 
In the 1968- 83 period the wholesale price index showed: 
Genera l index 
Agriculture 
Manufac t uring 
Machinery and equipment 
Chemical products 
258 . 8% 
376.3% 
232.8% 
207 . 3% 
144 . 0% 
This list shows t hat agricultura ! inputs have lagged in price 
increases making agriculture more profitable. Also, given tha t 45% of the 
manufactured output comes f rom food process ing, the subsidy s tructure seems 
to have neutralized the higher input costs t o this industry, in favor of 
consumers . 
Two cases are quite relevant. Whit e rice (S% broken grains) had a 
consumer price increase of 55% in 1980- 84 to reach Bs8 . 50/kg while whea t 
flour had a 20% increased to reach Bs3 . 50/kg, and pasta had no increase to 
remain at Bs7 .00/kg. 
White maize f lour, with over 70% of local corn content increased by 
85% in t hose four ye?rs to r each Bs6 . SO/kg while yellow corn flour, with 
95% imported corn cont ent increased by 27% t o close a t Bs3.50/kg. 
Let us t ake a look a t price discrepancies as of 1984 and 1985 for sorne 
imported items . 
1984 (Feb) 1985 (Dec) 
Mínimum farro Import price Ninimum farro Import price 
price at Bs4 . 30/US$1. 00 price at Bs7 .50/US$1. 00 
White corn 1,800 Bs697 3 ,000 Bs1 , 125 
US$162.00 US$ 150 .00 
Yellow corn 1,600 Bs654 2 , 800 Bs1,058 
US$ 152,00 US$141 . 00 
\o.'hea t Bs702 Bs1,268 
US$ 163 . 25 US$169.00 
Sorghum 1, 400 Bs606 2 , 200 Bs 1, 013 
US$ 141 . 00 US$135.00 
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Table 5. Food itemsa that increase in consumption at lower income strata in 
Venezuela. 
Re ion 
Carabobo Zulia Yaracuy Portuguesa 
Products Pasta (1) Pasta (1) Pasta (1) 
Pulses (1) Pulses (l) Pulses (1) Pulses (1) 
Sugar (1) Haize (1) Maize (1) Maize (1) 
Soft drinks (1) Sugar (1) Eggs (1) Soft drinks 
Poultry (1) Vegetable oil (1) Powdered milk (1) Fish (3) 
Eggs (1) Fish (3) 
Embutidos (2) Powdered Milk (1) 
Embutidos (2) 
a. 1 = high-import component; 2 
.component. 
medium-import component; 3 
SOURCE: FUNDACREDESA. 
Eggs (1) 
low-import 
(1) 
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Table 6 . Percent distribution of calorie and protein contribution for the diet 
according to the mos t important products in Venezuela, 1982. 
Calorie distribution (%) Pro te in distribution (%) 
Product To tal Local Impor t s Total Local Imports 
Rice 7 . 74 7 . 74 5.69 5 . 69 
Maize 14.64 2. 77 11. 87 10.77 2 . 04 8.73 
Wheat 15.88 o. 12 15.76 21.22 o. 17 21.05 
Caraota l. 61 0.47 1.14 4 . 28 l. 24 3.04 
Beans o .19 o .19 0.62 0.62 
Vegetable oil 10.95 3 . 07 7 . 88 
Ocumo 0.20 0 . 20 0.12 0 . 12 
Po tato 0 . 87 0.78 0.09 0.80 0.7 2 0.08 
Cassava 1.35 l. 35 0.37 0.37 
Avocado 0 . 23 0.23 0.07 0.07 
Cambur 2.78 2 . 78 1.64 l. 64 
Oranges 0.46 0 . 46 0.31 0.31 
Pineapple 0.07 0 . 07 0 . 02 0 .02 
Plantain 1.93 l. 93 0.69 0 . 69 
Onion o . 15 o. 15 o .18 o. 18 
Tomato o .10 o .1 o 0.29 0 . 29 
Sugar 15.91 4.79 11.1 2 
Cacao 0 . 20 0 . 20 0 . 22 0 . 22 
Coffee 0.06 0 . 06 0 . 28 0.28 
Total percent 75 .32 27.46 47 . 86 47 . 57 14 . 67 32.90 
Vegetable sector 
percent 100 36 . 46 63 . 54 100 30 . 84 69.16 
SOURCE : INN . CORDIPLAN . 
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A contradictory situation emerges when the government intends to 
stimulate local production through high prices and also wants to keep the 
price of food low to the urban consumer. The higher the national component 
in the processed foods, the higher the cost to the manufacturer. As a 
result, there will be inflationary pressures or direct subsidies will have 
to increase (Table 7) . 
In 1984, the preferential exchange rate system cost the government 
Bs3,000 million (US$230 million) (Hernandez). 
Commercialization policies also changed drastically with the 
elimination in 1985 of the Corporación de Mercadeo Agrícola (CMA) which had 
been created in 1971 to ensure adequate supplies of food to consumers at 
affordable prices by importing food to cover domestic shortages; buy local 
production at mínimum set prices and provide cleaning, drying, and storage . 
Three products were most-favored by this institution: maize, sorghum, and 
rice. In the seventies, CMA increased its market participation by buying 
up to 75% of rice, 70% of sorghum, and 65% of maize production. 
From its creation CMA absorbed nearly US$8,500 million, which could be 
accounted for by direct subsidy transfers, red tape costs, and plain 
inefficiency . 
The elimination of CMA implies that ｾｾｃ＠ handles import licenses and 
grains are imported directly by users. The Corporation directly handled 
imports until 1979 at which time the prívate sector took over, previous 
license approval from CMA. 
A concerted price policy, to reduce the inflationary impact on the 
consumer while local production reacts favorably to the stimulus created, 
is in effect . A mixed body, including the ministers of agriculture, 
finance, and the treasury, along with processors and producers, tackle 
prices and problems making "changes without decrees" (Latín America Weekly 
Report, Sept. 1985). 
Starting in 1983, the government decided to completely eliminate the 
direct price subsidies even for basic food items. The last one to go was 
the dairy subsidy, in mid-1984. Other subsidies eliminated were those 
protecting rice, maize flour, vegetable oils, and feed grains. 
To compensa te for this direct subsidy elimination, important 
reductions in input costs were established . Therefore, interest rates, the 
rediscount rate for agricultura! loans, were reduced and a 50% subsidy on 
fertilizers was approved. Fertilizer subsidy had been eliminated in 1981 
but after a tripling of its price, the subsidy was reinstated. 
A package of special credit, extension, and crop insurance policies 
have been designed to cover priority items in an effort to reactivate their 
local production in the mid-term. The most relevant are cereals (rice, 
maize, sorghum), oilseeds , pulses, livestock products, and the traditional 
export crops (coffee, cocoa, and sugar cane). 
Credit policies. Traditionally, this t ool has concentrated its 
efforts in supplying cheap, abundant credit to large producers and food 
Table 7. Internal to international price ratios in Venezuela , 1972-82. 
Item 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Maíz e - 1.00 l. 22 l. 22 1.65 1.56 l. 56 1.85 2 . 46 2.64 3.21 
Sorghum 1. 00 0.79 0.71 0.97 1.22 1.54 1.41 1.15 1.16 1.47 l. 93 
Sugarcane 
-
1.00 0.55 4. 19 1.18 1.48 1.64 2.34 0.95 1.53 2 . 95 
Beef 
- 1.00 0 . 91 1.04 1.08 0.87 - - - 0.99 1.01 
...... 
(.¡.) 
Dairy - - - 1.00 1.37 1.45 1.36 l. 28 1.80 l. 41 1.41 
Por k - - - - 1.00 1.16 o. 72 1.08 0.85 0.99 1.01 
SOURCES: 1982 Statistical Yearbook, IMF 
MAC , Anuario Estadístico 
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processors, neglecting the small farmer (Wright, 1982) . In 1975, Banco 
Agrícola y Pecuario (BAP) was redesigned in an effort to give better 
coverage to small and larger farmers. Two ins titutions took over its 
functions: ｉｃｐ ｾ Ｌ＠ basically oriented to small and medium farmers and 
BANDAGRO, created in 1969, dedicat ed to larger producers and food 
processors. 
In 1974, FCA (Fondo de Credito Agropecuario) was created to s upply 
infrastructure and farro machinery credit f or the agricultura! s ector under 
MAC. I t does not grant direct credits; rather, they are channeled through 
other institutions . 
Presently, commercial banks are obliged t o place 22 .5% of their 
portfolios in farro loans, 17% t o growers, and 5.5% t o the agroindustry. 
In 1984 , the government reformed t he banking laws, lifting the 
repaymen t limit from 5 to 10 years, with 3 years grace. Interest ra t es for 
farmers were reduced from 11.7% to 8.5% at Bandagro. They have been a t 3% 
for I CAP loans. 
Credit recovery has a lways been a problem. With the new measures 
taken, repayment has improved substant i ally to about 90% for commercial 
growers and 75% for campes inos. Regiona l managers of ICAP offices are now 
evaluated, among other criteria, on the basis of credit recovery . This 
brought as a consequence a reduction of l oans granted to risky crops (such 
as cassava) and in favor of secure ones (grains). For ｧｲ｡ｩｾｳＬ＠ loans can be 
recovered at sales time, given the nature of the commercialization process . 
For cassava, marketing i s not central i zed a t storage points and there is no 
defined harvesting time . So, the practice of discounting the value of the 
loan is not viable . Therefore, lenders have absolute ly no control over 
cassava sales. 
Even the system to provide credit to small farmers cons titutes a too l 
to divert Venezuelan agriculture away from its traditiona l crops and into 
the new (ecologically ma l adap ted) f ood and feedstuffs. 
The t otal amount of cr edit directed t o agriculture reached it s peak in 
197 7 t o drop by almost Bs2,000 million per year therea f ter (Table 8) . At 
the same time , fiscal outlays fo r agriculture went f r om 8.7% of the total 
in 1974- 78 to 6 . 0% in 1979- 83 , reflecting changes in priorities tha t 
coincided with austerity policies and monetary r es tra int. 
In 1984, major revita lization actions for agriculture inc luded : 
payment of government agricultura! deb t to producers; expanding the 
availability of preferential prívate a nd public bank credit; 50% subsidy on 
fe rtilizer prices ; increased output prices for a selected set of 
agricultura! items (cereals, pulses, lives t ock products); andan 
import-quota sys t em t o ensure purchases of domestic production by the 
food-and feed-processing industry . 
Crop ins urance i s an added pol icy element designed to attract 
inves tment into agriculture. In 1980 , Congress creat ed AGROSEGURO with the 
shareho lders being FCA and I AN. The insurance covers total or partial 
losses in r ice , maize , sorghum, co t ton , and peanut s , when they are due to 
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Table 8 . Financing of publ ic and private ent i ties in t he agricul t ural 
sect or (mi l l ions of bol ivars) in Venezuel a , 1975- 1982 . 
Commerci al Public ent ities 
Year bank BANDAGRO ICAP FCA To tal 
To t al 
financing 
(Bank + total) 
1975 672 917 917 1, 204 2, 890 3 , 562 
1976 3 , 242 69 1 951 329 1, 971 5 , 213 
1977 3 , 725 1 , 11 2 1, 130 227 2, 469 6 , 194 
1978 1, 425 1, 305 1, 319 295 2, 919 4,344 
1979 398 1, 690 1, 097 483 3 , 270 3 , 668 
1980 1 , 41 1 1, 895 1, 322 264 3 , 481 4, 892 
1981 1 ' 777 1, 493 1, 629 201 3 , 323 5' 100 
1982 1, 280 1, 389 1,188 272 2,849 4,129 
SOURCE: Banco Central de Venezuel a , I n fo rme Económico de 1979 , 1981 , y 1982 . 
Fondo de Cr édit o Agr opecuario , Of i cina de Planificaci ón . 
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uncontrollable natural causes . Lives tock deaths of the same nature are 
also covered. 
Also, FCA covers losses of financial intermediaries when ｾｾｃ＠ declares 
preved disasters to qualify under the program. Maximum coverage limits 
have been defined for livestock, fisheries, coffee, c ocoa , oilseeds, 
cereals, sugar cane , and frui t s. Roots and tubers are not ｩｮ｣ｬｾ､ ･､＠ in thc 
list. 
Government expenditures. government expenditures in agriculture per 
hectare by 1980 were the highest among 10 countries In North and South 
America surveyed by Elias, and government expenditures on agriculture per 
person employed in agricul t ure were second only after t he US . Expenditures 
in research and extension increased rapidly in the fifties to stab i.lize 
thereaf ter until 1977, the last datum available, at about US$50 million 
(1960 dollars) per year . Irrigation expenditures also grew tremendously in 
the period of analysis presented by Elias (1950-80). 
The research institution FONAIAP has 5 regional cent ers and is based 
in Maracay. In 1980, MAC established the Integrated Program for 
Agricultural Development (PRIDA) which gives t echnical assistance to 
campesino organizations . 
Concluding comments 
The political and economic forces behind the present import 
substitution strategy are quite complex. Food processors, which are, for 
the most, direct i mporters of their own raw material, exhibit a good deal 
of market power concentration. They exert effecti ve pressures on policy 
makers to protect their own interests. This has probably been the reason 
behind an increasing specialization, both in terms of production and 
consumption, of a few imported items tha t are used as inputs for the local 
processing firms. Jaffe and Rothman (1977) concluded the fo llowing : 
"In general, the terms of interchange are heavily biased in favour of 
industry, creating a distorted economic s tructure with an increasing 
economic and technological dependence upon indus trialized countries . The 
changes in food consumption pattern are clearly part of this complex and , 
therefore, part of the distorted economic structure, which in the final 
analysis is the basis of underdevelopment. 
Sorne of the elements defining this implicit food policy, which emerge 
froro our analysis, are: 
The change towards high-import content and ecologically maladap t ed 
foods. 
The tendency towards manufactured foods incorporating a high degree of 
industrial processing, e.g., the change from husked maize to 
pre-cooked maize flour. 
The trend t owards high-cost nutrients, as shown by the increase in 
meat consumption and the growth of the animal feeds industry, amongst 
others" (Jaffe, Rothman) . 
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Status Quo of Cassava in Venezuela 
Cassava production has stagnated in t he country a t about 330 , 000 t ons per 
yea r since 1960 and with yields of 8 t /ha in 40 , 000 hectares (Table 9) . 
Present s tatus 
Production is highest in the eastern part of the country (Table 10) , 
and its sha re has grown within the 1960-85 period due to gains in 
production in the state of Bolí var and s t able product ion in the other 
s tates (BCV, 1974), Consumption of " casabe" (a kind of bread made f r om 
cassava flour) i s quite i mpor t ant in this regi on . 
Our survey of 50 producers conducted in Monagas in May 1986 r evealed 
t ha t about one- hal f of the farmer s surveyed did not use machinery , one- half 
of them used intercropping with maize , and fe rtilizer use was mos tly 
associated with t he presence of maize as well as use of o t her chemicals 
(Table 11). Among the 50 farmers surveyed , the average farm was 23 . 5 
hec t a r es and 2.2 hec t a res were under cassava . Yields fluctua t e widely from 
a round 5 t / ha t o over 20 t /ha depending on t echnology and crop management . 
Analysis of the survey is under way now. 
Except fo r t he highly mechanized farners , use of purchased inputs in 
cassava is qui te limited . Most farmers plant bit t e r varieties fo r sale to 
"casaberas" or t o process their own casabe , and they also plant a par cel 
(up t o one-ha l f a hec t are) of sweet varieties for home consump tion and 
occasional sales. 
The s t a t e that produces the most cassava is Zulia, in t he west , with 
15% of t ot al production . This area , as well as the rest of the c ountry , 
produces sweet varieties as opposed to the eastern section of the country 
\.;he re bit ter varie ties are predominant. 
The Andean states a re also ímportant producer s of the r oo t accounting 
for 31% of the t otal . However , per capita production here is lower due t o 
l a r ger population concentra tion . 
With r espect to consumption, there a r e no recent estimat es of cassava 
use in the country. A 1974 study condu c ted by BCV revealed that about 38% 
of all cassava i s de s tined t o animal feed , 40% is consumed in fresh forro by 
humans, 12% i s consumed in the fo rro of casabe , and the rest, 9% , goes to 
starch production (Table 12). 
In the 1965- 84 peri od analyzed , per capi t a consumption of cassava 
decreased at an annua l rate of 3 . 1%--the shar pest fall among carbohydrate 
foo ds . This reduction was accompanied by a 3 . 8% annual increase in its 
real r etail price--the highest price increase among carbohydrates (Tables 
13 and 14) . For Caracas , the INN 198 1 nutrition survey , revealed that 
cassava is mostly consumed by lower income groups (IV and V) , with an 
annual per capita consumption of 8 . 1 kg fo r the lowest income group (V) , 
6 . 2 kg for t he middle- l ow (IV) group and only 3 . 6 kg for the upper-income 
groups . 
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Table 9. Production (metric tons) of major carbohydrates in Venezuela, 
1960-85. 
Year Cassava Po tato Rice Maize Wheat 
1960 340 134 72 439 1 
1961 300 74 81 420 1 
1962 323 121 103 540 1 
1963 342 111 131 430 1 
1964 312 124 165 475 1 
1965 301 136 199 521 1 
1966 320 126 194 557 1 
1967 316 133 223 633 2 
1968 341 143 244 661 1 
1969 310 124 244 670 1 
1970 317 125 226 710 1 
1971 323 115 153 713 1 
1972 318 109 164 506 1 
1973 272 124 302 454 1 
1974 293 152 297 554 1 
1975 317 152 363 653 1 
1976 295 132 206 417 1 
1977 304 179 496 774 1 
1978 304 171 502 591 1 
1979 315 191 614 612 o 
1980 312 199 619 575 o 
1981 327 171 681 452 o 
1982 301 217 609 501 o 
1983 325 225 449 488 o 
1984 331 226 409 609 1 
1985 310 191 472 900 1 
Plantain 
296 
301 
275 
276 
287 
283 
279 
259 
293 
342 
370 
377 
372 
369 
382 
370 
363 
406 
445 
437 
418 
426 
413 
420 
438 
445 
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Table 10. Cassava production by state in Venezuela, 1983. 
Per capita 
Region and state Rectares Production production 
Eastern 
Bolívar 5,482 52,740 72 . 4 
Sucre 2,016 21,402 34.5 
Mona gas 3,987 42,313 99.3 
Anzoategui 4,270 30,960 41.1 
Central and central west 
Carabobo 2,409 1 o. 104 9. 1 
Cojedes 2,801 21 , 317 143.9 
Gua rico 853 7,536 18.6 
Falcon 144 546 1.0 
Lar a 278 2, 100 1.8 
Portuguesa 566 2, 611 5.5 
Apure 1,148 7,475 34.8 
Miranda 2,012 24 , 408 16. 2 
Andes and west 
Barinas 1,600 12,800 36.8 
Merida 1, 976 14,812 29.2 
Trujillo 917 4,680 8 . 5 
Tachira 2' 128 14,943 20.1 
Zulia 7,825 52,977 28 .8 
Total of regions 40,412 323,724 26 .8 
Totals for the country 40,526 324,733 20.4 
Summary of production 
Eastern 147, 415 45 .5% 
Central and central \vest 76,097 23 . 5% 
Andes and west 100,212 31.0% 
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Table 11. Characterization of the sample of cassava producers in Monagas , 
Venezuela , 1986 
Number interviewe 
so 
Average cassava lot 
Average farm lot 
3 .5 ha 
14.8 ha 
Fertilized / 8 
Mechanized""' 
1 
10 
Not fertilized 
2 
Cassava alone 
25 
Cassava 
25 
Fertilized 
Nonmechanized 
1 2 
15 \ 
Not fertilized 
13 
Fertilized 
Mechanized / 
8 
9 ｾ ｎｯ ｴ＠ fertilized 
1 
Fertilized 
Nonmechanized ( 
8 
16 --""' Not fertilized 
8 
21 
Table 12. Cassava , supp ly and demand (tons) i n Venezuela, 1960-7 2. 
Local Demand 
production I nte rmedi a t e Animal Casabe Dir ect To t a l 
Year supply (starch) f ood production consurnption demand 
1960 340 , 248 6 , 450 131 , 988 40,5 18 161, 292 340 , 248 
1961 339,223 14 , 310 131, 855 40, 131 152 , 927 339 , 223 
1962 322 , 805 22 '434 123 , 92 1 39 , 741 136 , 709 322 , 805 
1963 342,388 21, 558 134,237 39,354 147 , 239 342 , 388 
1964 311,697 16 , 439 11 9 , 066 38 , 964 137 , 228 31 1, 697 
1965 301 , 423 29,040 11 4 , 244 38 , 557 119 , 582 301, 423 
1966 320 , 000 24 , 912 124,053 38 ' 187 132,848 320 , 000 
1967 31 5 , 563 23 , 070 122, 190 37 ,800 132 , 503 315,563 
1968 340 , 882 40,818 132 , 027 40 , 800 127,237 340 , 882 
1969 309,84 7 41 , 550 11 9 , 892 37 ,200 111, 205 309 , 847 
1970 317 , 197 39 , 558 122 , 719 38 ' 100 11 6 , 820 317 , 197 
1971 322,724 46 ,1 58 124,62 1 39,000 11 2 , 945 322,7 24 
1972 318 ,170 46 ' 11 o 122 , 468 38 ' 100 111 ,492 318 , 170 
Ave rage 323 , 244 28 , 647 124 , 868 38 , 959 130,771 324 , 013 
SOURCE: Taken from Table 14. 
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Table 13 . Summary of annual growth rates (%) in agricultural parameters in 
Venezuel a, 1965-84. 
Per capita consumption 
Beef 
Por k 
Poultry 
Poultry total production 
Real retail prices 
Beef 
Por k 
Poultry 
1.3% 
2 . 3% 
5. ＹＯｾ＠
8 . 9% 
2.2% 
0 . 7% 
- 2.4% 
Relative price beef/poultry 4.6% 
Animal 
Maize/sorghum 
Urban population 
Total population 
a. For period 1965-1980 . 
10.4% 
23.3% 
4 . 2% 
3.3% 
Per ca pita consumption 
Cassava -3. 1% 
Patato - 0.0% 
Rice 2. 2% 3. 1 %a 
Wheat o. 7% 
Maize - 0 . 6% 
Plantain -0.8% 
Total production of 
cassava 0 . 0% 
Real retail prices 
Cassava 3.8% 
Po tato 2.6% 
Rice - 0.5% - 2.9%a 
Wheat 3 . 0% 
Maíz e 3 . 3% 
Plantain 1.6% 
Relative price 
cassava/wheat 0 . 8% 
Real income PC 1.8% 
Sorghum production 5.1% 
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Table 14. Real retail prices (in 1968 bolivars) of carbohydrates, and per 
capita real income in Venezuela, 1965-85 . 
Per Capita 
Year Cassava Po tato Rice Maize lf.Theat Plantain in come 
1965 $0 . 71 $0 . 87 $1.21 $0 . 73 $0 .64 $0 . 59 $3 . 38 
1966 $0 . 59 $1.10 $1.63 $0 . 69 $0 .63 $0 . 58 $3 . 34 
1967 $0 . 61 $0 . 97 $1.62 $0 . 71 $0.63 $0 . 58 $3.37 
1968 $0.70 $0 . 90 $1.61 $0 . 70 $0 . 62 $0.60 $3.30 
1969 $0 . 63 $1.01 $1. 54 $0 . 66 $0 . 61 $0 . 59 $3.42 
1970 $0 . 60 $0.90 $1 . 44 $0 . 66 $0.67 $0.49 $3.62 
1971 $0,64 $0 . 84 $1 . 42 $0.63 $0.65 $0.50 $3.58 
1972 $0.65 $0 . 95 $1.36 $0 . 63 $0 . 63 $0 . 54 $3 . 59 
1973 $0.63 $1 . 04 $1. 34 $0 . 76 $0 .61 $0 . 54 $3 . 69 
1974 $0 . 58 $0 . 93 $1 . 30 $0 . 79 $0.56 $0.52 $3.61 
1975 $0 . 73 $0.89 $1. 32 $0.80 $0.51 $0 . 60 $4.03 
1976 $0.79 $0 . 87 $1.17 $0 .89 $0 . 63 $0 . 65 $4 . 55 
1977 $0 . 89 $0.79 $1. 06 $0.79 $0.82 $0 . 62 $4.68 
1978 $0 . 85 $0 .78 $1.03 $0 . 78 $1.16 $0.62 $4.65 
1979 $0.94 $0.89 $1 . 02 $0 . 90 $1. 29 $0 . 61 $4 . 97 
1980 $1 . 00 $1 . 36 $1. os $1 . 01 $1. 15 $0.60 $4 . 80 
1981 $0.98 $1.55 $1.80 $1.13 $1.09 $0 . 65 $4.78 
1982 $0.91 $1.12 $1 . 50 $1.02 $0 . 91 $0 . 64 $4.65 
1983 $1.11 $1 .46 $1 . 43 $1 . 03 $0 . 86 $0 . 64 $4 . 36 
1984 $1 . 27 $1 .46 $1.54 $1.22 $0.90 $0 . 77 $4 . 11 
1985 $1.44 $1.67 $1. 45 $1 . 45 $0.85 $0 . 85 $3 . 97 
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A miscalculated effort was made in the late seventies t o incorporate 
cassava into the main stream of agroindustry in Venezuela. The amount of 
research done with the crop is quite impressive, both at the agronomic 
level (FONAIAP, UEV, UDO, LUZ, UNELLEZ FUNDATEC, etc.), and at the 
utilization end (UEV, UDO, Protinal, etc.). 
In the late seventies cassava was seen as an important alternative in 
the government import substitution policies. Eleven drying plants were 
created throughout the country in 1975-80 at a cost of about US$25 million. 
They were closed as of 1986. Most of them never got off the ground. 
Careful analysis revealed that soft credit lines were formula ted by the 
same institutions that sold the machinery, without considering the economic 
feasibility of success of those plants in terms of location, market 
expansion, social impact, labor needs, etc. Total installed capacity for 
these cassava plants was 250,000 tons or 75% of actual production. 
Econometric analysis of the demand for fresh cassava. Data from the 
INN only refers to quantities of products consumed. There is no 
expenditure information. Therefore, only time-series data were used to 
calculate the effects of changes in incomes, prices, and urbanization 
trends on per capita consumption of cassava. The period of analysis chosen 
covers the years 1965-84. 
Urban population grew faster than total population at 4.2% per year. 
Urbanization has a negative implication on cassava demand that goes beyond 
the effect of causing higher consumer prices due to the obvious increase in 
marketing costs. Because the root is highly perishable, urbanization 
presents special difficulties in market access. Effective barriers of 
entry emerge with the subsequent reduction in competitiveness in the market 
place. The lower degree of competition converge lower volumes of trade 
than would have taken place under a more competitive environment. 
The model proposed to estímate per capita demand for cassava includes 
its own real retail price, real retail prices of other carbohydrates, per 
capita real incomes and total urban population as independent variables. 
Parameter estimates show that urbanization has had a marked negative 
impact on consumption of fresh cassava in the country. Income did not have 
a significant effect on its consumption at the aggregate leve! most likely 
because it is a significant variable at lower income levels (as is the case 
in Colombia, Indonesia and Brazil, for example) and not significant or even 
negative at high income levels. So, in the aggregate the income elasticíty 
is very low, 0.08 (and not signifícantly different from zero, Tables 15 and 
16). 
Per capita consumption of cassava is also quite responsive to prices. 
The marked growth in íts own príce (at 3.8% per year) had a contractionary 
effect on íts demand of 0.38% per year (own príce elastícity of 0.10). 
Substitutíon away from cassava consumption was also caused by wheat and 
rice prices (cross príce elastícitíes of 0.13 and 0.18). 
These result s confirm that cassava has been discrímina ted against not 
only at the supply level, where policies encourage production of ímported 
food items, but also at the demand leve l wíth díscríminatory consumer price 
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Table 15. Elasticities of time seri es for several countries and per 
capita consumption of f resh cassava in Venezuela, 1965- 84 . 
Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Venezuela 
Own price - 0.43 - 2 .08 -0.10 - 0.21 - 0 .1 0 
(3.09)a (3 .59 ) (4.62) (3 . 08) (3 .53) 
In come 2 . 51 1.38 - 0 .1 3 0.03 0.08 
(1.73) (1.89) (7 .03) (0.13) (0 . 44) 
Urbani zation -1.55 -0.99 - 0.13 - 1 . 03 -0 .77 
(3 .14) (2.85) (5.52) (9 . 17) (6 . 90) 
Wheat rice NO 0.45 0.07 o. 11 o .1 3 
(3.01) (5.38) (l. 84) (2.60) 
Rice price 0 . 09 2 . 42 NO 0 . 64 o . 18 
(2.16) (2.78) (12. 24) (2.00) 
a. Figures in parentheses are t-s t a tis tics. 
Table 16. Elasticities of time series for several countries and per 
capita consumption of poultry meat. 
Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Venezuela 
Own price -0.46 - 0.19 - 0.33 -1. 19 - 0 . 92 
(10.45)a (1.73) (6 . 39) (6 . 26) (10.39) 
In come 0 . 88 0 .57 0 . 59 0.54 1. 09 
(10.86) (8.14) (10. 73) (1 • 54) (14.03) 
Beef price 0 . 61 0 . 80 - 0 .15 0 . 66 0.44 
-2 . 54 (8.88) (3 .10) (3 . 75) ( 1. 76) 
Por k price -1.1 4 0.39 0 .53 0.52 - 0 . 70 
(5 . 60) (l. 86) (6 .49) (2.36) (2 .1 2) 
a . Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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policies that have affected consumption of this root in favor of an 
imported cereal such as wheat . 
Potential demand for cassava 
As we have seen, cassava has been left out of t he main stream of 
import substitution and agroindustria l policies that have characterized the 
past three decades of Venezuelan agricultura! development . But cassava 's 
excellent agroecological adaptation to the different environments of the 
country make the root an obvious candidat e in the l ong t erm to substitute 
for i mported, fo od energy sources in both the food- and t he feed- processing 
indus tries. 
The obvious impediment at pr esent i s the complex set of polit ical 
economic forces t hat propitiated and maintain the actual state of things . 
The oligopolies exis ting in wheat milling and feed manufacturing are a l so 
heavily involved in the gr a in import business. These interes t groups play 
a vital r ole in the price and produc tion policy decision-making pr ocess . 
There are encouraging signs in bot h industries with respect t o 
utilization of local food items in their processing technologies. The 
wheat millers have experimented with cassava and rice f lour. They will 
have to use, by l aw , 15% to 20% of rice flour in production of pasta. 
With respect to feed, Protinal, the largest feed and poultry producer 
in the country (with 30% of the feed market) has been actively involved in 
dried cassava r esearch for an ima l feed. For the last four years, they have 
been operating a 100 ha plantation in Monagas (eastern part o f the c ountry) 
where exper iments with mzchanized planting and harvesting are progressing 
satisfactorily . A 250- m drying floor and a Thailand-type chipper , 
fo llowing CIAT's s pecifications , were built t o keep abreast of t he 
possibilíties in this a rea. The same firm has conduct ed experiment s in a 
"Central Yuquero 11 in the eastern part of the country, where artificial 
drying experiments are being conducted. 
Protinal thinks that the drying floors have a bright future in t hat 
regí an of Venezuela where abundant margina l but mechanizable land exists, 
drying conditions a re excellent (four months of dry season), and there is a 
cassava tradit ion tha t goes back several decades. Casabe prices have 
increased relative to wheat products; it is now more expensive than pasta 
and bread at around BslO/kg and its consumption has declined . Dry ing 
cassava offers an al ternative mar ket for fa rmers in t ha t region . 
Purina , the second l arges t feed manufacturer has also shown i nterest 
in dried cassava, following the e xample of its sist e r company in Colombia 
which has been a major user of dr ied cassava chips produced on the Atlant ic 
Coas t of that neighbor country . 
Fresh cassava offers also new possibilities to reduce the nega tive 
i mpact associated wit h t he h igh perishability of the roo t in a rapidly 
urbanizi ng soci ety . The new technology t o s t ore fresh cassava in pl astic 
bags and treat it wi th thiabendazol could have a tremendous impact on 
r educ ing r e t ail prices and expanding volumes sent into major urban zones . 
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By 1986, farmers' prices of fresh cassava were around Bs0.75 / kg to 
Bsl.10/kg while its retail price in Caracas was Bs5.95/kg. 
The marketing margin seems excessive in a city with excellent roads 
and with an appropriate wholesale market (Los Coches). Reducing 
perishability will enable farmers from more distant places to enter the 
market. Retailers will see their losses cut and they will also be able to 
négotiate larger volumes at wholesale outlets. 
Increased market access and lower commercialization losses due to use 
of the plastic-bag technology should result in sharp reductions in retail 
prices and markedly higher volumes of cassava being traded in the cities. 
In a country of high incomes, where food marketing usually conveys a high 
value-added to the final product, this type of technological innovation has 
a high chance for success. 
We turn now to analyze the prospects for cassava demand both as a food 
itero that competes with other carbohydrates and as a feed source. 
Carbohydrate foods. Venezuela continues to be dependent on imports 
for over 50% of basic agricultura! commodities (and perhaps 30% of total 
food consumption). Food imports (mostly cereals, oilseeds, dairy and their 
products) boomed after 1973, following the rapid oil price increase (Table 
4). In the 1965-84 period of analysis, the highest gains in per capita 
consumption went to rice at 2.2% per year. Actually, per capita 
consumption of rice in the 1965-80 period grew atan annual 3.1% 
accompanied by an equally impressive retail price reduction (in real terms) 
of 2.1% per year. In the eighties, white rice prices increased rapidly in 
real terms from Bs1.05/kg to Bs1.45/kg in 1985 (5% broken grains). 
Accordingly, per capita consumption of rice (paddy equivalent) ｾＱ･ｮｴ＠ from 
40.0 kg in 1980 to 25.7 kg in 1985. 
Per capita consumption of all major carbohydrates decreased during the 
period of recession, 1978-85, except that of wheat, for which a favor able 
price policy for bread and pasta meant a rapid real retail-price reduction . 
(Tables 14 and 17). 
Reductions in the price of rice during the 1965-84 period are the 
result of the rapid adoption of improved, high-yielding varieties, (HYRV), 
a process that started in 1959. By 1982 it was estimated that out of 
227,000 hectares cultivated with rice, about 200,000 used HYRV (mainly 
Araure 1) of which 30% was irrigated (M.J. Rosero in Dalrymple). By 1985 
area harvested was 148,000 hectares of which 40,000 were irrigated. 
government credit for nonirrigated rice has been declining. Yields have 
been increasing in the eighties due to a higher proportion of irrigated 
rice. They were of 3.2 t/ha in 1985 (USDA Grain and Feed Annual Report). 
Venezuela has been self-sufficient in rice since the early sixties and 
sorne exports have been registered of small amounts. Mechanized upland and 
a more intensive irrigated system are the predoroinant methods of 
cultivation. 
Industrialization is predoroinant for roilling. Of the 35% resultin g 
froro roilling, 23% goes to nonfeeding uses at poultry farms, and 12% goes 
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Table 17 . Per capita consumption for majar car bohydrates in Venezuela, 
1960-85. 
Rice 
Year Cassava Patato paddy Maíz e Whea t Plantain 
1960 42.3 16. 7 7. 5 32.3 36 . 9 36 . 8 
196 1 35 . 9 8 . 9 9 . 0 33 . 5 37 . 2 36 . 0 
1962 37 . 2 13.9 11. 4 39 . 9 30 . 5 31.7 
1963 37.9 12. 3 14.5 31.6 34.0 30 . 6 
1964 33 . 3 13 . 2 17. 6 48 .3 45 . 4 30 . 6 
1965 30.9 13. 9 22.5 39 . 9 43 . 2 29.0 
1966 31. 6 12.5 24 . 1 38 .4 42 . 2 27 . 6 
1967 30.1 12.7 27.2 41.8 52.6 24 .7 
1968 31.3 13.1 25. 4 57 .6 54 . 8 26 . 9 
1969 27 . 5 11.0 22.4 45 .0 50 . 7 30 . 3 
1970 27 . 2 10. 7 24 . 4 48 . 5 48 . 9 31.7 
1971 26 . 8 9.5 12. 7 51.6 46 . 2 31. 3 
1972 25 . 6 8 . 8 13 . 2 45 . 5 48 . 3 29 . 9 
1973 21. 2 9.7 23 .7 51.4 42 . 6 28 .8 
1974 22 . 2 11. 5 27.5 53.3 40 . 9 28 . 9 
1975 23 . 3 11. 2 29 .1 51.5 46 . 4 27 . 1 
1976 21.0 9.4 14 . 7 37 . 0 50 . 8 25 . 8 
1977 21.0 12. 3 34 . 2 53.4 48 . 7 28 . 0 
1978 20 . 3 11. 4 33 . 6 45 . 3 54 . 0 29 . 8 
1979 20 . 4 12. 4 40 . 4 42.2 45 . 9 28.3 
1980 19. 6 12 . 5 40 . 0 50 . 5 48 . 7 26 . 3 
1981 19.9 10 . 4 41.5 56 . 2 53 . 9 25 . 9 
1982 18 . 0 13.0 36 . 5 50 . 6 46 . 3 24 . 7 
1983 18 . 8 13.0 26 . 0 41.0 48 . 3 24 . 3 
1984 18 . 6 12.7 22 . 9 35 . 9 60 . 9 24 . 6 
1985 16. 9 10. 4 25 . 7 29 . 4 56.8 24 . 2 
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into animal feed. Between 2% and 4% of white rice goes into brewi ng and 
more elabor a te f oods . 
Per capita c onsumption of white rice was a t 17 kg by 1985 with t otal 
consumption increasing with income level. 
Corn consumption is per capita terms showed no s igni f icant trend over 
the 1965-84 period, while the real retail price of maize flour increased at 
3.3% per year. 
About 75% of domestic availability goes to the flour-processing 
industry . The rest goes into feed manufacturing. Apparent per capita 
disappearance in 1985 was about 30 kg. Corn consumption increases as 
income level decreases (Hernandez, lESA) . It is a basic staple at low 
income levels. The maize-processing industry has a high degree of 
mar ket -power concentration. 
Wheat is almost exclusively imported and cons titutes a basic dietary 
source wi th 21% of the total protein need and 40% of vegetable needs being 
supplied by it (Hernandez Doc . #1.). Venezuela i mports much , high-priced 
wheat mostly f r om the United States (UCV Economía). 
About 90% of the wheat rea ches a second milling phase. Of t his , 59% 
goes into bread and pastry , 25% into pasta , 5.5% into cookies, and 10% into 
domestic use of wheat flour . Milling i s highly concentrated while pasta 
and bread processing have lower degrees of market-power concentration. 
Per capita availability of wheat was around 56 kg in 1985 . Bread 
consumption increases with income level while pasta shows the oppos ite 
trend (Rernandez , lESA). 
Per capita consumption of fresh carbohydrates shows no significant 
trend fo r potatoes and plantains and shows a decrease fo r cassava. Prices 
of these three items increased in rea l terms . 
Should present trends continue, the die ts of the Venezuelans will 
contain even more imported wheat, wi th rice and maize having a chance to 
maintain their sha res, given the strong government suppor t to producers. 
Potatoes, cassava, a nd planta i ns will continue t o be replaced due to the 
consumer pricing policies favoring wheat. 
Mea t s. The lives t ock sector has been ver y dynamic over the past two 
decades. Its contribution t o GDP has increased , spurred by a fast-growing 
poultry indus try al though pork, beef , and dairy have made i mport an t gains . 
Per capita consumption of poultry grew in 1965-84 a t an annua l 5.9%, 
pork a t 23%, and beef a t 1. 3% . The faster gr owth for poultry was 
accompanied by a continued reduction i n its real reta il price a t 2.4% per 
year, the result of the rapid adoption of modern technol ogies (Table 13) . 
In per capita t e rms, beef has been surpassed by poultry (16.7 kg 
ver sus 19.6 kg) and pork i s a distant t hird wi th 6.2 kg. 
31 
A rather conservative scenario has been assumed. Per capita real 
incomes in 1985-2000 will increase at an annual 1. 0%, population will grow 
at 2.8% per year, and the real retail price of cassava will decrease at an 
annual 1. 0% while other real prices remain constant. 
The price fall is based upon the assumption that plastic bags will be 
gradually adopted. With this t echnology, consumers will pay less, farmers 
will receive more (Janssen and Wheatley) because of a significant reduction 
in waste and marketing costs, and by the formation of stronger markets. 
Therefore the assumption of a reduction in the cassava retail price 
rests initially on the implementation of the new storage technology . In 
such a case the rate of reduction in price could be much higher than the 
one proposed for this exercise. An additional assumption for projections 
is that with this technology, commercialization losses of cassava will be 
reduced from an estimated present level of 25% to 15% in the fresh market. 
If there is a parallel development in the drying industry , losses will be 
reduced to 5% since the additional 10% of cassava that is not suitable f or 
the fresh market dueto quality problems (small size or broken), and that 
is currently left on the field, could be utilized by this industry. 
Therefore, the final effect on additional production requirement s will be 
20% less due to better crop use . 
Fresh cassava . The 1984 per capita consumption level of 18.6 kg will 
increase to 19.1 kg by the year 2000 . The increase in per capita 
consumption is the result of the own-price decrease (Table 18). 
Under those circumstances, i mplied cassava production will reach 
541,000 tons (over the 331,000 tons produced in 1984). Again , a 10% 
waste-reduction equivalent (around US$4 million) is assumed to be 
associated with the new storage technology. Therefore increments in 
production for the year 2000 will amount to 156,800 tons, or 15, 680 
additional hectares of production assuming a yield of 10 t/ha (Table 18). 
Dried cassava. Our estimates indicate t he following : 
Dry cassava competes with locally produced sorghum, but not with 
i mported sorghum at t he preferentia l exchange rate (Tables 19 and 20) . 
Against local sorghum, cassava drying is a profitable alternative for 
feed manufacturers, entering in the optimal least-cost solutions at 
80% of the price of sorghum. Sorghum has a higher protein content 
and, f or tha t reas on, cas sava must cost less . 
Therefore, the viability of its production remains subject to policy 
decisions . 
Whether cassava is incorporated into the main s tream of import 
sub stitution and feed proces sing will be a political decision depending 
upon both industry and government willingness to stimulate this promising 
root. 
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Table 18. Projec tions for time-series model for the year 2000 in 
Venezuela. 
Dried cassava 
Annual rates of growth 
Per capita r eal income 
Population 
Real retail price poultry 
Sorghum production 
Variables levels 
Population (millions) 
Per capita consump tion (kg) of: 
Beef 
Por k 
Poultry 
Pork meat produc tion 
Poultry mea t production 
Total feed production 
Pork feed production 
Poultry feed production 
Haiz:e/sorghum 
Implicit use 
Imports 
Dried cassava 
Percent in fe ed 
Required produc tion 
Maiz:e/sorghum i mpo rts 
Foreign exchange ea r nings (mill ions of US$) 
Fresh/dried cassava conver sion 
Cassava yield/ha 
Fresh cassava labor/ha 
Dri ed cassava labor/t 
Fresh cassava required (000 t) 
Required hectares 
New jobs generated 
Fresh cassava 
Annual r at es of growt h 
Per capita rea l inc ome 
Population 
Real retail price fre sh cassava 
Variable levels 
Population (millions) 
Per capita consumption of fresh cassava (kg) 
Fresh cassava production 
Production inc rease (0 00 t ) 
Addi t ional hectares for cassava 
New jobs gene r ated 
Final balance f or fresh and dried cassava 
Additional produc t ion for fre s h cassava (000) 
Required hec tares 
New jobs generated 
l. O 
2 . 8% 
-l. o:: 
1984 
17 . 8 
19. 1 
6.4 
16.9 
114 .5 
290 .2 
2 ,955.5 
956.1 
1,744.4 
1, 92 1. 4 
1, 300.0 
10. 0% 
1.0% 
2.8% 
-1. 07. 
1984 
17. 8 
18.6 
331 . 0 
2000 
28 . 3 
7.9 
25 . 2 
223.0 
784 . 9 
5 ,7 36.6 
1, 783 . 7 
3 , 204 . 6 
3 , 728.8 
2 , 012.6 
573.7 
1 , 438.9 
$57.4 
2 . 5 
10 . 0 
45 . 0 
3.0 
1, 380 . 0 
137,996.0 
34,545 . 6 
2000 
28.3 
19. 1 
541 . 8 
156.8 
15,680 . 0 
3,763.0 
1, 536.8 
153,676 . 0 
34,545.0 
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Table 19. Profitability of a cassava drying floor, Monagas, Venezuela, 1986. 
2 Drying floor (m ) 
Months of operation Ｈｭｯｮｴｨｳｾｹ･｡ｲＩ＠
Drying load operation (kg/m ) 
Dried cassava sales Bs/t 
Labor cost (wage) 
Conversion of fresh to dried cassava 
Fresh cassava yields/ha (kg) 
Dried cassava, transport costs (Bs/t) 
Sorgbum price at farro gate 
Internal rate of return 
Net present value (10%) 
Annual capacity, fresh cassava 
Annual capacity, ha 
1,000 
4 
12 
$2,010 
$50 
2.5 
12,500 
$100 
$2,513 
15.0% 
$93,391 
576,000 
46.1 
Investments Unit cost ($) Units 
Cement floor 
Chipping area 
Warehouse 
S creen 
Equipment 
Chipper 
Motor 
S cale 
Tools 
Wheelbarrows 
Shovels 
Rakes 
Collectors 
Sacks 
Plastic sheet 
Sub total 
Unforeseen, 5% 
Working capital 
Total 
60 
100 
160 
15 
10,000 
15,000 
1, 500 
350 
28 
15 
so 
3.5 
3 
30 
1000 
32 
336 
240 
1 
1 
1 
6 
12 
4 
4 
200 
500 
1400 
1985 Bs 
60,000 
3,200 
260,000 
45,000 
368 , 200 
10,000 
15,000 
1,500 
26 ,500 
12,000 
3,000 
4,000 
4 ,000 
20,000 
40,000 
83,000 
477 '700 
23,885 
42,000 
543,585 
Table 20 . Distribution of direct costs for cassava (fresh and dried) and for sorghum, Monagas , 
Venezuela, 1986. 
Total Cos t 
Variable (Bs/ha) (Bs/t) 
Land . $8 . 33 $0 . 04 
Labor $47 , 466 . 67 $206.02 
Capital $59 , 371.12 $257 . 69 
Total 106 ,846.12 $463 . 74 
Fresh cassava yielding 
Farm ga t e price , 85% sorghum 
Cross margin 
Sorghum production costs, Monagas - 1986 
Yielding: 2 . 5 tons/ha 
l-1echaniza t ion 
Inputs 
Labor 
Land 
Labor 
Capital 
Total 
Farm gate price 
Gross margin 
Total + 20% 
1,228 . 464 
1,058 . 28 
288 
Total 
$20 . 83 
$288.00 
$2 , 286.74 
$2,595 . 58 
ＤＲ ｾ ＲＰＰ＠
$1 • 162 
$12,500 
$1,870 
$515 
Cost 
(Bs/t) 
$8 . 33 
$115 . 20 
$914 . 70 
$1,038 . 23 
Free exchange rate 
Cost (Bs20=US$1 . 00) Official 
(Bs/ t) (US$/t) (Bs7.5=US$1 . 00) 
$2 . 54 
$592 . 27 
$760 . 69 
$1,355.49 
Free exchange 
rate 
$0.42 
$5.76 
$45.73 
$5 1.91 
$110 . 00 
$58 . 09 
$0 . 13 $0.34 
$29 . 61 $78 . 97 
$38 . 03 $101.42 
$6 7. 77 $180.73 
Official exchange 
rate (Bs7 . 5=US$1 . 00) 
$1.11 
$15.36 
$121.96 
$138 . 43 
$293 . 33 
$154 . 90 
w 
ｾ＠
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From our time-series demand estimation of pork and poultry in 
Venezuela (Sanint et al.) we translated those elasticities for projected 
consumption of those two types of meat for the year 2000 (Table 16). 
It was assumed that the present ratio of feed going into broilers and 
layers remains constant (i.e., there will be an equally dynamic demand for 
eggs, which appears quite reasonable) and that pork and poultry feed will 
continue to represent 85% of that market (dairy and other uses will also 
show important growth; again, a proposition likely occur). 
For the year 2000 , the model predicted per capita consumption of 
poultry at 25.2 kg (up from 16.9 kg in 1984), that of pork at 7.9 kg (up 
from 6.4 kg in 1984) and feed use at 5.7 million tons (from 3 million in 
1984) (Table 18). 
Substituting only 10% of dry-cassava chips into feed formulas for the 
year 2000, 575,700 tons of dried cassava will be required (that will 
substitute about US$57 million of coarse grain imports). Ata 2.5 
conversion rate of dry to fresh cassava, 1.4 million tons of fresh cassava 
will be required to meet this requirement and 137,996 addi tional hectares 
will have to be cultivated (assuming yields of 10 t/ha, which is rather 
conservative). The exercise also assumes that 10% of what is produced for 
fresh cassava consumption can be incorporated into dried cassava, since 
that proportion is usually left in the ground at harvest time because it 
will not meet market standards. But those remainings ("colas") are 
perfectly acceptable for drying. 
Total needs for additional cassava (in both the fresh and feed 
markets) by the year 2000 will reach 1.5 million tons, using 153,676 
additional hectares, and with 34,546 new jobs generated in the process. 
Concluding Comments 
Venezuela has made considerable efforts to substitute food imports and 
reduce its level of dependence on foreign suppliers. The food-processing 
ability of the country has expanded very rapidly but the raw materials 
demanded contain a high proportion of imports. Wheat is almost one hundre d 
percent imported, whil e 60% of coarse grains used in feed production are 
imported. This is in spite of the massive subsidies and price incentives 
given to farmers of those crops, and the rapid growth in corn and sorghum 
production. 
In terms of potential, cassava has much to offer. It is the cheapes t 
source of energy in the tropics. That undeniable evidence should be put to 
work. The crop ' s ability to grow under a very wide range of ecosystems and 
the present low yields, indicate that Venezuela could use many of its 
unproductive lands to cultivate cassava and achieve substantial 
productivity gains. 
The present dilemma of substituting expensive local grains for cheap 
imported ones and at the same time provide cheap, abundant food to the 
urban consumer mus t be broken by means of productivity, rather than area 
expansion, in arder to keep prices of local products low and competitive. 
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Increasing sorghum and maize yields far beyond their present levels 
(which are based on heavy use of subsidized fertilizers) is unlikely, but 
with cassava, it is a different story . Present average country yields of 
8 . 0 t /ha are very low . Protinal, under field conditions, obtains 15-20 
t/ha. At those levels, cassava becomes a much better alternative than 
coarse grains in Venezuela. 
The case of f resh cassava also merits attention. With the 
introduction of cassava- bagging techniques impressive results can be 
achieved , as the Colombian experience (Bucaramanga pilot-project) 
demonstrates. 
The political and economic forces behind the present import 
substitution stragety are qui te complex. Food processors, which are, for 
the most, direct importers of their own raw material, exhibit a good deal 
of market-power concentrtion. They exert effective pressures on policy 
makers to protect their own interests . This has probably been the reason 
behind an increasing specialization, both in terms of production and 
consumption, on a few imported items that are used as inputs for the local 
processing firms. 
As sorne of these firms (Protinal , Purina) turn their attention to 
cassava, the future of this root may be bright in Venezuela . 
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